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Abstract—This paper explores advances in reconfiguration 
properties of SRAM-based FPGAs, namely Partial Dynamic 
Reconfiguration, to improve the resilience of critical systems that 
take advantage of this technology. Commercial of-the-shelf state-
of-the-art FPGA devices use SRAM cells for the configuration 
memory, which allow an increase in both performance and 
capacity. The fast access times and unlimited number of writes of 
this technology, reduces reconfiguration delays and extends the 
device lifetime but, at the same time, makes them more sensitive 
to radiation effects, in the form of Single Event Upsets. To 
overcome this limitation, manufacturers have proposed a few 
fault tolerant approaches, which rely on space/time redundancy 
and configuration memory content recovery – scrubbing. In this 
paper, we first present radiation effects on these devices and 
investigate the applicability of the most commonly used fault 
tolerant approaches, and then propose an approach to                  
improve FPGA resilience, through the use of a less intrusive 
failure prediction scrubbing.  It is expected that this approach 
relieves the system designer from dependability concerns and 
reduces both time intrusiveness and overall power consumption. 
Keywords—dependability; failure prediction, real-time; 
embedded systems; FPGA; SEU  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) were first 
introduced as prototyping platforms or as low-cost replacements 
in applications with low volume Integrated Circuits (IC) 
requirements. These devices are now increasingly being used 
for production in engineering areas, such as industrial, 
automotive and space, due to their flexibility and ability for fast 
in the field reconfiguration. Recent advances in FPGAs, take 
advantage of fast memory cells (SRAM) for storing 
configuration data, which allow shorter access times and an 
unlimited number of reconfigurations, when compared to flash-
based devices. However, this memory technology is known to 
be very sensitive to radiation effects, manifested in the form of 
Single Event Upsets (SEU), thus limiting its applicability in the 
just mentioned areas. Therefore, some form of fault tolerance is 
mandatory to improve the resilience of these devices, and allow 
its use in critical systems. 
Manufacturers have been studying the radiation effects on 
these devices for a long time [1], and have thus introduced a 
couple of radiation-hardened space-grade devices. These 
Radiation-Hardened-By-Process (RHBP) devices present severe 
limitations, in both cost and performance, when compared with 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices. This led 
technology companies to start using less resilient COTS devices 
for deploying critical systems in harsh operating environments, 
and adding some form of fault tolerance.  
To overcome SEU effects in SRAM-based FPGA 
configuration memory, one of the major manufactures, Xilinx, 
have: i) introduced error detection and correction mechanisms 
in their line of devices – frame Single Error Correction and 
Double Error Detection (SEC-DED) and device wide Cyclic 
Redundant Checks (CRC); ii) proposed to take advantage of 
spatial redundancy – using their X-TMR tool [2]; and iii) 
allowed configuration memory content to be refreshed 
(scrubbing). Although significantly improving device 
resilience, their overheads, in both device area usage and time 
delays, makes them unsuitable for remotely located critical real-
time systems. Research community have also proposed 
alternative approaches [3] to error detection and correction, by 
means of partial reconfiguration (addressing just the faulty 
region), but most of them need external hardware and target 
very specific devices.  
With the introduction of Partial Dynamic Reconfiguration 
(PDR) functionality by Xilinx, to support the time multiplexing 
of FPGA resources, it is now possible to keep a subset of the 
device running (static module) while other parts (dynamic 
modules) are being reconfigured. The implementation of an 
Internal Configuration and Access Port (ICAP), running at 
much higher speeds than the external configuration ports 
(SelectMap, JATG, etc.), opens the possibility to trigger the 
partial reconfiguration from the inside of the FPGA, at a much 
faster and predictable time, and therefore support critical real-
time systems. 
This work investigates the feasibility of using partial 
dynamic reconfiguration to improve the resilience of FPGA-
based production systems, with strict timing requirements and 
constraints on device area usage. To accomplish this we 
propose an approach on how to continuously adapt the 
scrubbing parameters, using device health information, from 
both FPGA embedded sensors, and data from external sources. 
Through the use of failure prediction, we expect to: i) reduce 
the scrubbing mechanism time intrusiveness, by activating it 
only when needed; ii) improve overall power consumption, by 
activating the scrubbing less frequently; and iii) add an adaptive 
layer of system dependability, to cope with dynamic 
environments and hardware aging.  
The paper starts with an introduction, where we identify the 
problem and introduce a few suitable technologies to address it. 
Following, in Section II, we describe the FPGA internals, the 
failure modes and the fault model. In Section III, we present a 
brief overview of current fault tolerance approaches and 
dependability assessment tools. Section IV presents the 
background for the on-going and future work that is presented 
in Section V, where we propose a few improvements over some 
well known Fault Tolerant (FT) approaches, and discuss the 
roadmap. Finally, in Section VI we present the conclusions of 
this work. 
II. FPGA FAULTS 
Every SRAM-based FPGA is composed by a matrix of 
Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB), connected by routing 
resources, with additional storage and input/output elements. 
Every device has a Configuration Memory (CM) for storing the 
user implemented design/data, and control bits. At power-up, a 
bitstream file is loaded from the external permanent storage, 
usually a flash memory, to the internal configuration memory. 
The bitstream file is generated by an Hardware Definition 
Language (HDL) tool.  
Radiation induced SEU in these devices may produce a 
large number of Single Event Effects (SEE), which generate 
one or more bitflips in the internal FPGA storage elements. 
Although having a common source, their effects could be very 
distinct, depending on the affected memory component. FPGA 
storage elements can be divided in five main groups: 1) 
Configuration Memory, which has the largest number of storage 
bits and is used to store the user design; 2) Block Memory 
(BRAM), used to store the design state; 3) Distributed Memory, 
which is part of specific CLBs, where the Lookup Table 
Elements (LUT) can be used as shift-registers or distributed 
RAM; 4) Flip-Flops, that are present in all CLBs  and are used 
to store the design state; and 5) Internal Device Control and 
State, composed by a set of bits that are critical to the correct 
functioning of the device [4][5].  
Configuration memory is the largest FPGA memory 
element and is used to store the user design [6]. While upsets in 
other memory elements of the FPGA may crash the device 
completely or corrupt the design/system state, these upsets, 
although transient, may produce a permanent change in the 
implemented functional design (logic and routing), and 
ultimately a system failure. According to [7], these faults 
represent more than 80% of the total faults affecting FPGAs. 
Also, due to the large amount of Programmable Interconnect 
Points (PIP) needed to interface all the CLB matrix, a large 
percentage of configuration memory bits used in the 
implementation are thus non-sensitive (faults that affect these 
bits do not produce any changes in the design). 
Depending on the number of affected cells per upsets, we 
may classify them as Single-Bit Errors (SBE) or Multiple-Bit 
Errors (MBE). Although the frequency of MBEs is increasing, 
due to the high-level of integration in recent devices, SBEs are 
much more frequent, with an approximate ratio of 20:1 [8]. The 
shape of MBEs usually follows a circular pattern around the 
radiation impact centre cell, and may spread over multiple 
frames (a frame is a single bit column that spans the entire 
configuration memory vertically [4]). 
Our focus is on transient and intermittent faults that affect 
FPGA configuration memory, which may produce permanent 
errors in the functional logic and routing resources. This is 
justified because some FPGA components, like Flip-Flops (FF), 
are inherently more resilient to SEU, and also because memory 
locations that store user data (BRAM) are actively protected by 
Error Correction Codes (ECC). This is not the case with the 
configuration memory cells that implement the user design 
logic, were the computed frame ECC may be easily accessed, 
but single-bit errors are not automatically corrected, relaying 
this decision to the system designer. 
III. FPGA FAULT TOLERANCE 
Xilinx, one of the two major FPGA manufacturers, has been 
introducing several fault tolerant technologies for SRAM-based 
devices. Mechanisms such as: readback CRC checks during 
boot-up and throughout system execution; and frame ECC bits 
for single-bit error correction and double-bit error detection, are 
available to the system designer to improve system resilience. 
A. Existing Approaches 
Scrubbing, the process of refreshing configuration memory 
data, can be implemented in different ways: blindly full/partial 
scrubbing to restore the initial configuration memory contents; 
using SEC-DED codes and PDR to locate and correct the error; 
and Readback and Compare, which continuously monitors the 
configuration memory and reload/reconfigure, when necessary. 
The main drawbacks of scrubbing are: i) delays introduced in 
accessing configuration memory; ii) the size of the minimum 
addressable block, a frame, that includes a few hundreds bits; 
and iii) the need to use external circuitry in devices that do not 
support PDR. 
Spatial Redundancy is the most used approach to mitigate 
the errors induced by SEUs. A popular implementation of this 
type of redundancy is Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), 
which triplicates the implemented system and the associated 
voters in the feedback loops. When applied to FPGAs, TMR 
should be combined with some form of partial scrubbing to 
restore the fault tolerance level, by reconfiguring the affected 
TMR domain. Examples of commercially available tools that 
automatically generate a full/partial TMR protected system 
from a non-protected one are: X-TMR, STMR, and BL-TMR. 
The main drawback of this approach is the FPGA resource 
overhead (3+ times the size of the unprotected system), and the 
need to recover the faulty TMR domains to restore the previous 
fault tolerance level. This is not feasible in cost sensitive 
application and remote location deployment, like space, where 
weight is at a premium. 
Temporal Redundancy is able to mask transient errors, but 
special care should be taken in order to handle permanent 
errors. Device resource overhead is small but the introduced 
delays limit its applicability to non real-time systems. 
B. Dependability Assessment 
To assess the dependability properties of an FPGA-based 
embedded system and the fault tolerance mechanisms in place, 
one possibility is to inject faults in the system and monitor its 
behaviour. Depending on the technology used for the injection 
of errors in the FPGA configuration memory, the methods are 
grouped in hardware-based fault injection (FI) and software-
based FI. The high maintenance costs of the hardware-based FI 
facilities and the need to prepare the device die surface before 
each FI campaign make it unaffordable to most institutions. To 
overcome this limitation, some researchers took advantage of 
PDR properties to simulate SEE in the FPGA configuration 
memory, assuming a bitflip fault model. On the other side, 
software-based FI has higher precision, better controllability 
and lower costs, but pose a few concerns related to the 
representativeness of the injected faults. 
 There are only a couple of FPGA software-based fault 
injectors, mainly from academia research projects, and these are 
targeted at now obsolete FPGA device families (caused by 
major changes in the FPGA internal design after the 
introduction of each new family). All of these fault-injectors use 
some form of bitstream instrumentation, either before system 
startup (offline) or during system execution (online).  
• FLIPPER and FLIPPER2 [9]. Targeted at Xilinx 
Virtex-2  and Virtex-4, respectively, they use partial 
reconfiguration to inject single and multiple bitflips in 
configuration memory. FLIPPERs mimic the radiation 
experiments and allow to identify design sensitive bits 
and evaluate the SEU sensitivity of an ASIC prototype 
implemented in an FPGA.  
• FT-UNSHADES [10]. This fault injector was created to 
study the effects of radiation-induced faults in ASICs, 
assuming a bitflip fault model. This system  is able to 
inject bitflips in FFs, through PDR, on a Xilinx FPGA. 
The FPGA implements both the "faulty system" and the 
"fault-free system" and compares their output to inform 
the host computer that a failure occurred.  
• SEU Simulator [11]. It uses PDR to corrupt the FPGA 
frames while the system is running. It is composed of 
three FPGAs, two running the user circuit in parallel 
(golden design and design under test) and a third one 
responsible for real-time output comparison. The 
simulator can be used to classify the user design 
configuration bits as being sensitive or non-sensitive.  
• SEU Controller Macro [12]. Developed by Xilinx as a 
reference design for a Virtex-5 FPGA development 
board, this module is able to simulate hardware faults, 
and corrupt configuration memory bits, in order to 
assess error detection and correction mechanisms. This 
macro takes advantage of PDR to inject single and 
double adjacent bitflips in configuration memory cells. 
IV. CURRENT WORK 
As preliminary results of this work, in [13] we have 
described our initial thoughts on how to improve the resilience 
of FPGA-based systems by taking advantage of PDR. Our main 
goal was reducing the FPGA fault tolerance mechanism 
footprint while increasing, or at least providing the same level 
of fault tolerance achieved with current approaches. At the 
same time, we introduce the idea of proactive adaptation of the 
fault tolerance mechanisms to the evolving requirements of the 
operation environment. 
Using a development board from Digilent – XUPV5, with a 
Xilinx Virtex-5 chip that supports PDR, we were able to build a 
System-On-Chip (SoC) based on a single FPGA. This setup 
allowed us to acquire deep knowledge of the dynamic 
reconfiguration process, and identify the steps ahead. In this 
setup the recovery of the faulty system was performed by a 
Microblaze soft core that access FPGA configuration memory 
through the ICAP interface, for faster reconfiguration speeds. 
In [14], using the setup described above, we detailed the 
dynamic properties of real-time control systems that could 
benefit from using PDR, as the underlying technology for 
implementing fault recovery mechanisms.  Considering the 
controlled system time constant and the size of the implemented 
controller in the FPGA, it may be feasible to reduce space 
redundancy to a minimum and simply recover the module 
during the available idle time in between control loops. The 
main questions addressed in this contribution were: How fast 
can we reconfigure a Reconfigurable Partition (RP) of a specific 
size? How does this interfere with the control loop and the 
controller performance? 
To assess the dependability of FPGA-based systems, we 
needed a tool to perform fault injection at FPGA configuration 
memory level. Thus, in [15], we evaluated the Xilinx SEU 
Controller Macro (SEU-CM) as a first basis for a fault injection 
tool. This tool uses PDR, through the ICAP interface, to recover 
single-bit errors from configuration memory, in a read-modify-
write approach. As it relies on a single SEC-DED code per 
configuration memory frame (1312 bits in a Virtex-5 device), it 
only allows the detection of single and double-bit errors, and 
provides the identification and correction of single-bit errors. It 
also includes the possibility of changing the configuration 
memory contents on the fly, using the same mechanism. Thus, 
system designers can take advantage of it, as a primitive tool to 
assess the fault tolerant mechanism in use. 
The results of the SEU-CM evaluation showed that, 
although not initially developed to support fault injection, it 
could be used to inject errors in FPGA configuration memory 
cells, with some limitation: 
• Low efficiency, as it randomly injects faults in unused 
FPGA location. It is thus necessary to clearly identify 
the area of the FPGA where the Device Under Test 
(DUT) is located, and target only this area. 
• Low observability of the DUT at low level due to the 
little amount of information available from Xilinx on 
the bitstream internal format. One could, at the system 
design level, attach probes to the RP interfaces in order 
to monitor the I/O and perform data logging. 
• Limited fault model, which only considers single or 
double adjacent bitflips. While single frame multiple 
bitflip injection can easily be achieved by changing 
SEU-CM VHDL code, simultaneously injecting 
multiple bitflips in adjacent frames cannot be done 
instantaneously, as each frame is read-modified-written 
at a time. Thus simulation of radiation-induced 
multiple-bit upsets is compromised. 
• Lack of automation, to extend the fault injection 
campaigns and collect enough data to attain statistical 
significance. 
Driven by the need to assess the dependability properties of 
the proposed fault tolerance approaches, and the inexistence of 
a reference fault injector for SRAM-based FPGA user designs, 
we developed our own fault injector.  This tool, Fault Injector 
for Reconfigurable Embedded Devices (FIRED) [16], uses the 
PDR error injection approach of the SEU-CM as a starting 
point, and extends its capabilities by: i) defining regions of 
interest for the FI campaign; ii) extending the fault model to 
include multiple-bit errors that span beyond a single frame; iii) 
improving observability by attaching probes to the RP 
interfaces and logging I/O data to an external SQL database; 
and iv) precisely defining each injected fault (location, trigger, 
type, pattern, etc.). 
 
Fig. 1. Implemented fault injector (FIRED) hardware and modules, which 
uses PDR for error insertion in FPGA configuration memory. 
In Figure 1, we show the hardware components and 
modules that compose FIRED. On the hardware side, is uses a 
PC to define and control the experiments, and an FPGA 
devboard to implement the low level error injection and data 
collection modules. The PC executes the Fault Generator (FG), 
the Experiment Management Environment (EME), and finally 
the Result Analysis (RA) components. On the devboard, the 
Injection Runtime Controller (IRC) is responsible for:  i) 
introducing errors in the FPGA configuration memory, using 
ICAP; ii) collecting input/output DUT data for offline analysis 
(saved to the Local Storage); and iii) controlling the DUT and 
the workload. The communication between the devboad and the 
PC is accomplished through a TCP/IP connection. 
The fault injector IRC is implemented on the unused cells of 
the FPGA, side-by-side with the DUT. The later is confined to 
an RP (depicted in Figure 1 by a dashed line), which, by the 
intrinsic parallelism of the FPGA, provides the needed isolation 
from FIRED components.  
Following, to evaluate the radiation effects in the FPGA 
configuration memory and the device failure modes, we 
implemented a PID-based cruise control system in VHDL, to be 
used as a testbed (see Figure 2). This controller complies with 
the general FIRED DUT interface: 32-bit input, 32-bit output, 
CLK line, Enable and Reset signals.  The main goals were: i) to 
study the effects of bitflips in the controller (in this specific case 
a PI controller); ii) to identify the more sensitive areas of the 
FPGA; and iii) to verify the feasibility of blindly scrubbing, and 
see how it copes with the strict timing requirements of real-time 
systems.  
 
Fig. 2. PID-based cruise controller module with the I/O signals. 
This controller can be connected to an external DC motor 
with shaft rotation encoder, or to a VHDL simulated system. 
The simulated system allows the user to speedup the system 
dependability assessment and provides a completely 
deterministic system.  
In [17], we used FIRED to perform an extensive fault 
injection campaign in the PID-based cruise control system, and 
characterise the cumulative SEU effects in real-time systems. 
Two important results obtained were related to the fault latency 
and fault interaction.  
In this FI campaign we injected 10 single-bit faults in 
accumulation throughout each experiment, with 42 seconds 
duration. The workload was composed by a periodic square 
wave with two different settings for the desired cruise control 
speed. The outcome of each experiment was compared with a 
goldrun (fault free experiment) to detect a system failure. Any 
deviation from the desired output was classified as a failure 
(which accounted for 28.4% of all experiments).  
The root cause analysis showed that the vast majority of 
failures were caused by a single fault (99.4%). The remaining 
0.6% of the failures was caused by interacting faults, which 
wouldn’t occur if they were injected isolated. Analysing the 
latency of the single-fault failures, we noticed that more that 
half have high error latency. These results allow us to think that 
fault tolerant approaches based on scrubbing could be 
successfully applied to these types of systems, if we tackle a 
few problems, namely: power consumption overhead, system 
state recovery, and time/space FT mechanism intrusivness.  
With a better understanding of FPGA resource allocation it 
may be possible to avoid blindly scrubbing unused frames of 
the configuration memory and, as there are a large amount of 
bits in the used frames where a bitflip won’t have any effect on 
the implemented logic, even avoid some of the used frames 
when non-sensitive bits are affected. The main question here is 
whether to refresh a couple of frames that map to a high-level 
logic unit (e.g. the proportional part of a PID controller), or all 
the user design. This information is mandatory to recover the 
system during control loop idle time, in critical real-time system 
that don’t show high error latencies as the one evaluated.  
The short amount of information provided by the 
manufacturers about the mapping between the high-level HDL 
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descripting of the system and the low-level bitstream data 
generated by their tools (Xilinx only provides information about 
the LUT location on their application notes), makes it difficult 
to understand the effects of bitstream errors in the controller 
logic. There are a few 3rd-party tools [18] [19] that tried to 
reverse engineer the bitstream contents and generate an XDL 
file, with the logic resource allocation and routing resources, 
but they are targeted at very specific devices and the results are 
far from being complete. This limitation led us to instead 
monitor the interfaces of the DUT as an approach to detect a 
system failure. 
The main goal of this work is not related to the error 
detection and reactive system recovery, but to improve the fault 
tolerance by means of preventive and proactive fault tolerance 
approaches. The error detections and correction in such systems 
is by itself a full topic of research, and the specificities and the 
limitations of the FPGA error detection mechanisms impose a 
prohibitive time overhead that could affect the functionality of 
the implemented design. 
V. WORKPLAN 
Critical real-time systems have very stringent timing 
requirements, which may not allow the designer to follow the 
guidelines from manufacturers [8]. The use of simple periodic, 
full or partial, scrubbing in such systems may impose a huge 
overhead in power consumption, intrusiveness, and lack the 
adaption needed by changing environments.  
Our goal is to provide the system designer with an 
Intellectual Property (IP) core that could be used to improve the 
resilience of FPGA-base production system, without the need to 
evaluate and decide on the scrubbing approaches proposed by 
manufacturers. This solution will allow the system to have the 
same level of CM latent error removal, while adapting the 
scrubbing frequency to the device status and the operating 
environment properties. 
The workplan can be divided in three steps: i) identify and 
correlate device and operating environment sensor data, with 
the device health status; ii) implement failure prediction 
scrubbing using the previously identified data sources with 
machine learning algorithms; iii) validate this approach, 
comparing it with the periodic blindly scrubbing, by means of a 
fault injection campaign. In the following subsections, we detail 
the work involved in each step and how we plan to approach it. 
Finally, we shall also explore the concept of dependable 
adaptive systems which, instead of reducing their computation 
to the minimum when entering an harsh environment to limit 
interferences and avoid system failures, change their modular 
structure to make them more resilient. This will allow reducing 
device usage to a minimum throughout time, which will have a 
positive impact on power consumption.  
A. Device and Environment Sensor Data Sources 
In order to fine-tune the scrubbing subsystem, it is 
necessary to identify which data sources provide a better insight 
of the device condition and environment properties. This is 
accomplished by executing extensive FI experiments and data 
correlation. 
Internal data coming from FPGA embedded sensors, can 
provide inputs about the device status. In the specific case of the 
Virtex-5 device, it is possible to know the working temperature 
and all the DC-DC converters output voltage. If we could 
correlate any fluctuation in the converters output voltage or the 
expected temperature rise, due to a high overload or a short 
circuit (when a SEU affects a routing resources), we may as 
well predict an eminent failure of the protected module.  
It is also possible to implement additional probes inside the 
FPGA configuration memory, that may provide valuable 
information about the switching delays in CLB internal 
components, or that are able to capture very short duration 
glitches in their outputs [20].   
External information may come from different sources, such 
as a web service, that could provide information about solar 
radiation bursts and environmental condition (temperature, 
humidity, pressure, etc.), or even external sensors connected to 
the FPGA (instant power consumption, etc.). 
B. Failure Prediction Scrubbing 
To take advantage of all available data, we propose a system 
architecture based on an additional component, which we 
named fpScrub, implemented in the FPGA programmable logic. 
This component is responsible for triggering the partial 
reconfiguration (scrubbing) of the Protected module, when 
needed. He gathers information from different sources, both 
internal and external to the FPGA.     
 
Fig. 3. Failure predition scrubbing implementation in a Xilinx XUPV5 
(Virtex-5) development board, showing the fpScrub component and his 
interfaces (dashed lines limit the reconfigurable partition).  
In Figure 3, we present the system architecture, with the 
main component, fpScrub, monitoring the Protected module I/O 
and connected to: i) ICAP, through a PLB bus, for 
reconfiguration purposes; ii) internal FPGA sensors, to monitor 
device health; and iii) external data sources, through an Ethernet 
interface, to gather operating environment data. 
In specific situations, where the range of the Protected 
module inputs and outputs are bounded and known in advance, 
the fpScrub component could continuously monitor his 
interfaces to detect an upcoming problem. 
C. System Validation and Improvements 
The proposed approach will be validated using fault 
injection,  and the results compared with the periodic blindly 
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scrubbing. The outcomes of these FI experiments are expected 
to show improvements, in both temporal intrusiveness and 
device power consumption, when applied to systems with high 
error latency. On the contrary, in systems with low error 
latency, the overhead of the fpScrub will be significant as its 
scrubbing frequency approaches the periodic blindly scrubbing. 
Afterwards, if we are able to identify the device elements 
where the user designs reside and understand the mapping to 
the high-level representation of the system, we could increase 
the scrubbing granularity, by splitting the bitstream in smaller 
chunks. This allows the proposed approach to address more 
complex systems, that otherwise wouldn’t be supported. In 
situations where the fpScrub is unable to completely refresh the 
Protected module, in between two control loops, it tries to 
refresh as many as it can. During the recovering period the user 
design will be running in a degraded mode. As soon as the last 
piece is recovered, the user design is in an identical state as it 
was just after the FPGA boot-up sequence. In order to do this, 
we need to assure that the recovery won’t affect the system 
state. Otherwise we need to consider some form of 
checkpointing.  
If we wish to extend the fault model to include permanent 
faults in FPGA logic cells, we need to address the problem of 
static routing in RPs (sometimes HDL tools use internal RP 
routing resources to implement a shorter path between two 
external components). Otherwise it won’t be possible to 
dynamically relocate the system to other FPGA cells in the 
presence of hardware defects. The presence of intermittent 
faults may be a good indicator of the occurrence of these 
phenomena, such as hardware aging and manufacturing defects.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper described the PhD research work, the current 
state and the future plans in exploiting Partial Dynamic 
Reconfiguration of FPGA devices to improve FPGA-based 
production systems dependability. 
In the current work we started by analysing the PDR 
capabilities of current devices, for improving the fault tolerance 
of SRAM-based FPGAs. Following we evaluated the SEU 
Controller Macro, as a free available tool for fault injection. In 
order to automate the full FI campaign, we developed our own 
fault injector for FPGA-based embedded devices – FIRED. We 
finished with a study on the effects of cumulative faults in a 
PID-based cruise control system, which showed high error 
latency and the evidence of interacting faults. 
Giving continuity of this work, in the workplan we identify 
the final steps to implement a new approach to improve FPGA 
resilience, through an adaptive scrubbing. This takes into 
account device health information from embedded sensors, 
together with external environmental data, to trigger scrubbing 
only when needed. When compared to the periodic blindly 
scrubbing, we expect it reduce both the temporal intrusiveness 
and the power consumption, while providing the same level of 
fault tolerance in static environments. We also expect it to 
improve FPGA-based system resilience in evolving operating 
environments and under device hardware aging, as it will 
provide the system with an adapive layer of fault tolerance.  
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